The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Herman Cappelen The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in Impression: 1. All rights reserved. No part of this. Liberating Content. The Inessential Indexical. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever Oxford University Press, forthcoming
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This, more than anything else I’ve read recently, has made me reconsider how I should be going about my research. If I were to teach a graduate class on assertion, many if not all of these essays would be required reading. Publications Pages Publications Pages.
As a result, Insensitive Semantics has been and will continue to be widely discussed This book pushes the discussion of context—sensitivity forward in new and useful directions. It is a vivid and powerful call for philosophers to examine their assumptions about philosophy.
No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. Suppose also that a principle of interpretative charity of some or other sort demands that these philosophers be ‘taken at their word’ — i. But I also think that we can say a little more — if only to clarify what prima facie unifies the canonical cases.
View all 3 comments. Bibliographic Information Print publication date: Collection of 14 essays discussing Insensitive Semantics.
Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions – PhilPapers
In general, it can take some work to figure out what the target claim is, hence what the test properties are. Cheong Cheng Wen rated it it was ok Mar 22, But he finds none. How Philosophers Use Intuition and ‘Intuition’. Epistemology of Intuition in Epistemology categorize this cappeelen. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence.
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No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. E-mail this page Share on Facebook Share on Twitter. Anyone interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy or the proper description of contemporary philosophical practice will benefit from studying it.
Herman Cappelen: Philosophy without Intuitions
Chalmers – – Philosophical Studies 3: Lists with This Book. That would be exciting. What is the point? Philosophers’ use of ‘intuitive’ III: Intutions Impossible Mark Jago. Are the definitions right?
Philosophy Without Intuitions – Herman Cappelen – Google Books
The argument from philosophical practice looks more promising. The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers.
Everyone knows that the term “intuition” and “intuitively”, etc. But why would anyone think that? Truth is monadic, propositions are true or false simpliciter But the attribution of any one of these features — certainly as glossed by Cappelen — to the mental states that Cappeleb is about is a highly unobvious, theoretical claim about them: This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Nikki Karagach rated it really liked it Sep 07, Later I’ll suggest a different outcome.
To purchase, visit your preferred ebook provider. But his overall case against the strategy doesn’t founder on this. It takes up more than a third of the book — that’s too much, given that the argument from ‘intuition’-talk isn’t just a straw man’s argument, but seems hopeless; to clarify: Last, nothing turns on Centrality being stated in terms of intuitions — rather than, say, intuitive judgments or beliefs or even intuitive verdicts or contents.
I hope that this work inspires similar investigations that continue his important project and deepen his normative critique without being so irresponsible and brash about it. What rendition of Centrality, if any, does the resultant line caappelen reasoning support?
Philosophy Without Intuitions
Contents Overview and Taxonomy. Each listed feature also gets elaborated in some detail — in ways that are richly informed by what a diverse hermwn of prominent meta-philosophers have said about the nature and epistemology of intuitions e.
Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their wifhout discipline: What I want to focus on, however, is that we’re not provided with a diagnostic for the first practice-referencing feature in particular — intuitions’ role in the method of cases. I still think that paradigms serve the purpose: Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account.
Unfortunately, however, the synonymy thesis doesn’t seem remotely plausible.